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The Robert E. Hudec Article on Global Trade 
 
Facilitating Preferential Trade Agreements between 
Developed and Developing Countries: A Case for 
“Enabling” the Enabling Clause 
Won-Mog Choi and Yong-Shik Lee 
ABSTRACT 
Regional trade agreements (RTAs) have been a salient feature of the 
world trading system in recent decades, and most of the RTAs in force 
include developing countries. To assist developing countries with 
economic development, the Enabling Clause of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) allows developing countries to enter into 
RTAs on favorable terms. The Enabling Clause has not been widely used, 
however. Nor has it been successful in achieving its objectives. This 
paper examines the reasons behind this apparent failure of the Enabling 
Clause and proposes regulatory reforms, including a revision of the 
Enabling Clause and the revitalization of paragraph 10 of GATT Article 
XXIV. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The proliferation of regional trade agreements (RTAs) has become a 
salient feature of the multilateral trading system. In the early 1990s there 
was a rapid increase in the number of RTAs, and their numbers have 
continued to increase without subsiding.1 As of August 2010, as many as 
194 RTAs were in force.2 RTAs are an important exception to the most 
favored nation (MFN) requirement of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) Article I.3 GATT Article XXIV provides legal cover 
 
 Won-Mog Choi, Professor of Law, Director of the WTO Law Center, Ewha Law School, 
Ewha Womans University, Seoul (wmchoi91@hanmail.net); Yong-Shik Lee, Director and 
Professorial Fellow of the Law and Development Institute, Sydney 
(wtogeneva@hotmail.com). 
 1. Regional Trade Agreements, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2011).  
 2. Wog-Mon Choi & Yong-Shik Lee, Appendix to Facilitating Preferential Trade 
Agreements between Developed and Developing Countries: A Case for “Enabling” the 
Enabling Clause, 21 MINN. J. INT’L L. ONLINE 1 (2012) [hereinafter Appendix]. 
 3. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 
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for RTAs that liberalize “substantially all” trade among the signatories 
and do not raise trade barriers against non-member countries.4  
The Enabling Clause5 also favors developing countries entering into 
RTAs by relaxing some of the requirements under Article XXIV. Article 
XXIV facilitates RTAs among developing countries to promote their 
economic development.6 
Despite this regulatory preference, however, the Enabling Clause 
has not been widely used. Although 86.5% of all RTAs in force involve 
one or more developing countries as members, and nearly half of all 
RTAs in force involve only developing countries, the Enabling Clause 
has been invoked as legal cover for only 15.4% of all RTAs in force.7 In 
total, the Enabling Clause has been used for less than one-third of RTAs 
involving only developing countries, despite its substantial preference for 
developing countries.8 This raises the question of whether the Enabling 
Clause can effectively assist developing countries by facilitating RTAs. 
This article addresses this important question and examines why the 
Enabling Clause has not been widely used by developing countries, 
despite the legal preference it shows to developing countries entering into 
 
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. GATT Article I prohibits discriminatory treatment in 
trade based on the origin of the product. Article I.1 provides: “With respect to customs 
duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with importation or 
exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments for imports or exports, 
and with respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all 
rules and formalities in connection with importation and exportation, and with respect to 
all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III,* any advantage, favour, 
privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or 
destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the 
like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.” 
Id. art. I, ¶ 1. 
 4. Id. art. XXIV, ¶¶ 5, 8. See generally Mitsuo Matsushita & Y.S. Lee, 
Proliferation of Free Trade Agreements and Some Systemic Issues - In Relation to the 
WTO Disciplines and Development Perspectives, 1 L. & DEV. REV. 22, 31–33 (2008) 
(stating that GATT article XXIV ¶ 8 is unclear as to the meaning and measure of 
“substantially all” trade, for which the 1979 addition of the “Enabling Clause” added 
clarity by relaxing the “substantially all trade” provision by exempting less-developed 
members from adhering to the requirement of liberalizing substantially all trade as long as 
they offer a mutual reduction or elimination of tariffs).  
 5. Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller 
Participation of Developing Countries, ¶ 2(c), L/4903 (Dec. 3, 1979), GATT B.I.S.D. 
(26th Supp.) at 203, ¶ 1 (1980) [hereinafter Enabling Clause] (“Notwithstanding the 
provisions of Article I of the General Agreement, contracting parties may accord 
differential and more favourable treatment to developing countries, without according such 
treatment to other contracting parties.”). Containing the “Enabling Clause” at paragraphs 
one through four, this document is one of the four Tokyo Round agreements called the 
“Agreements relating to the Framework for the Conduct of International Trade” and has 
been incorporated into WTO agreements.    
 6. See GATT, supra note 3, art. XXIV, ¶ 4.   
 7. Appendix, supra note 2.  
 8. See infra section II. 
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RTAs. If it has not been successful in achieving its stated objectives, then 
the Clause should be revised. Section II will examine the legal 
requirements of GATT Article XXIV and the legal interpretation of the 
Enabling Clause. Section III will discuss the possible reasons why the 
Enabling Clause has not been widely used and will propose regulatory 
reforms that may assist developing countries to grow through preferential 
trade agreements (PTAs). 
II.  GATT ARTICLE XXIV AND THE ENABLING CLAUSE 
A.  ARTICLE XXIV 
For an RTA covering trade in goods to be  consistent with the 
requirements of the World Trade Organization (WTO), GATT Article 
XXIV requires that parties to the agreement must eliminate all tariffs and 
other restrictive regulations on “substantially all the trade” between 
them.9 In other words, Article XXIV authorizes only fully-liberalizing 
free trade agreements (FTAs). The various viewpoints regarding the 
correct interpretation of the phrase “substantially all” can largely be 
subsumed under the labels “quantitative approach” and “qualitative 
approach.” 10  Several arguments have been articulated under the 
quantitative approach. One such argument is that trade barriers with 
respect to greater than 80% of trade between RTA parties should be 
eliminated to satisfy the “substantially all” requirement. 11  Another 
argument advanced is that barriers with respect to greater than 95% of 
trade at the level of the Harmonized System 6 unit must be eliminated.12 
 
 9. GATT, supra note 3, art. XXIV, ¶ 8 (allowing customs unions and free-trade 
areas to eliminate restrictive regulations of commerce on substantially all the trade 
between them, except, where necessary, those permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, 
XV, and XX).   
 10. E.g., Matsushita & Lee, supra note 4, at 31–33 (stating that there has been 
controversy regarding whether the term “substantially all” requires a quantitative or 
qualitative measure of compliance in trade restrictions).   
 11. See Won-Mog Choi, Legal Problems of Making Regional Trade Agreements with 
Non-WTO-Member States, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 825, 828–29 (2005). See generally Treaties 
Establishing a European Economic Community and a European Atomic Energy 
Community (ECT) ¶ 30, L/778 (Nov. 29, 1957), GATT B.I.S.D. (6th Supp.) at 70, 99 
(1958) (“[T]he Six had proposed the following definition: a free-trade area should be 
considered as having been achieved for substantially all the trade when the volume of 
liberalized trade reached 80 per cent of total trade.”). For a comparison of the arguments 
for and against a qualitative measure of trade restrictions see WTO Secretariat, Systemic 
Issues Related to “Substantially All the Trade”, WT/REG/W/21/Add.1 (Dec. 2, 1997). 
Supporting the EC’s original argument, the EFTA States noted that the phrase 
“substantially all trade” was not the same as “trade in substantially all products.” Id.  
 12. See Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Communication from Australia, 
WT/REG/W/22/Add.1 (Apr. 24, 1998) (elaborating on Australia’s argument that 
“substantially all trade” should be defined as an agreement with at least 95% of all the six-
digit tariff lines listed in the Harmonized System). The 95% figure is arbitrary, but would 
lead to more liberalized trade between parties, and the Harmonized System is suggested 
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A third argument is that the level of trade barrier elimination can be 
determined only after taking rules of origin into consideration13—i.e., if 
rules of origin are implemented more strictly, more trade barriers should 
be eliminated.14 Rather than relying on an absolute quantitative threshold 
such as 80% or 90%, those advocating a qualitative approach have 
responded that the range of tariff elimination should cover even those 
sectors in which there is little trade between the parties. In particular, if 
lack of trade in an area is due to trade barriers, that area should not be 
excluded from the scope of tariff elimination. 15  As a result, those 
advocating a qualitative approach argue that the “substantially all” 
criterion should be assessed based on the present as well as potential 
future trade between RTA parties, not just trade that is currently taking 
place.16  
Despite this variation in criteria, there has been a broad consensus 
that most of the RTA signatory parties’ trade in goods must be subject to 
the tariff elimination requirement. As a result, mutual exchange of 
favorable treatment—the elimination of mutual trade barriers to goods—
is a necessary condition of concluding an RTA under the authority of 
Article XXIV. Third-party countries, however, will still be subjected to 
such barriers. Consequently, the existence of an RTA will result in less-
favorable trade conditions for countries not a signatory to the RTA. This 
strays from the MFN treatment obligation under the GATT.  
In order to promote liberalization, the WTO Agreement created an 
exception to the MFN principle that allowed the establishment of RTAs. 
Paragraph 5 of GATT Article XXIV stipulates: 
[T]he provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent, as between the territories 
of contracting parties, the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area or 
 
because it is a neutral system that counts all goods regardless of whether the parties 
actually import or export the listed products. See id. 
 13. See Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Statement by the Delegation of 
Hong Kong, China on Systemic Issues, WT/REG/W/27 (July 8, 1998) (arguing that the 
preferential rules of origin are not real “origin” rules but are instead related to trading 
arrangements such as RTAs’ definition of “substantially all trade”). 
 14. See Choi, supra note 11. 
 15. See, e.g., Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Note by the Secretariat: 
Synopsis of “Systemic” Issues Related to Regional Trade Agreements, WT/REG/W/37, ¶¶ 
52, 54–55 (Mar. 2, 2000) (stating that restrictive regulations of commerce should be 
eliminated with respect to “substantially all the trade” in originating products between 
parties, and that the qualitative approach requires that no section be precluded from intra-
RTA liberalization). See generally Customs Unions and Free Trade Areas: European Free 
Trade Association, ¶¶ 47–58, L/1235 (June 4, 1960), GATT B.I.S.D. (9th Supp.) at 83 
(1961). The GATT Working Party’s evaluation of the Stockholm Convention, the 
Agreement establishing the EFTA, also argued that by excluding the agricultural sector, a 
“major sector of economic activity,” the EFTA violated the GATT obligation to 
substantially include all areas in the elimination of tariff and non-tariff measures. See id.; 
Matsushita & Lee, supra note 4, at 31–32 (discussing trade liberalization regarding 
agriculture).   
 16. See Choi, supra note 11. 
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the adoption of an interim agreement necessary for the formation of a customs 
union or a free-trade area.17 
Without this exception, WTO members would be prevented from 
becoming parties to RTAs.  
B.  THE ENABLING CLAUSE 
For many developing countries considering regional trade 
integration, full compliance with Article XXIV’s “substantially all the 
trade” requirement is a demanding task, given the desire to protect their 
infant industries.18 Through the Enabling Clause, however, the GATT 
contracting parties have permitted grants of special treatment for the 
benefit of developing countries.19 Before the enactment of the Enabling 
Clause, special treatment had been accorded to developing countries on a 
case-by-case basis through a series of waivers. After the Enabling Clause 
was codified, these waivers became a permanent feature in the GATT 
system, with the Enabling Clause serving as a permanent and substantive 
legal basis for according special treatment to developing countries.20 This 
allows developing countries to enter into PTAs, which lower trading 
barriers between them, without fulfilling Article XXIV’s requirement of 
full liberalization of “substantially all the trade.”21  
Paragraph 1 of the Enabling Clause establishes that: 
“Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 of the General Agreement, 
contracting parties may accord differential and more favourable 
treatment to developing countries, without according such treatment to 
other contracting parties.”22 Paragraph 2 of the Enabling Clause specifies 
which preferential and differential treatments are allowed:  
(a) Preferential tariff treatment accorded by developed contracting parties to 
products originating in developing countries in accordance with the Generalized 
System of Preferences, 
(b) Differential and more favourable treatment granted with respect to the 
provisions of the General Agreement concerning certain non-tariff measures 
governed by the provisions of instruments multilaterally negotiated under the 
auspices of the GATT; 
(c) Regional or global arrangements entered into amongst less-developed 
contracting parties for the mutual reduction or elimination of tariffs . . . ; 
(d) Special treatment on the least developed among the developing countries in 
 
 17. GATT, supra note 3, art. XXIV, ¶ 5. 
 18. There has been much debate about the validity of protecting infant industries as 
means to develop an economy. Nevertheless, GATT provisions authorize infant industry 
protection and allow developing countries to take measures to promote infant industries 
under provisions such as Article XVIII. See YONG-SHIK LEE, RECLAIMING 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 56–62 (2006).   
 19. See Matsushita & Lee, supra note 4, at 31–33. 
 20. See Choi, supra note 11, at 851–53. 
 21. See GATT, supra note 3, art. XXIV, ¶ 8. 
 22. Enabling Clause, supra note 5, ¶ 1. 
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the context of any general or specific measures in favour of developing 
countries.23  
Paragraph 3 of the Enabling Clause further stipulates that such 
differential treatment is permitted only under the condition that “any 
differential and more favourable treatment provided . . . shall be designed 
to facilitate and promote the trade of developing countries and not to 
raise barriers to or create undue difficulties for the trade of any other 
contracting parties.”24 
Paragraph 2, subparagraph (c) regulates RTAs “amongst” 
developing countries, which are a form of “regional or global 
arrangements . . . for the mutual reduction or elimination of 
tariffs . . . .”25 It should be noted that what this provision exempts from 
the MFN obligation are RTAs entered into “amongst less-developed 
contracting parties.”26  This means that only less-developed countries 
that are also members of the WTO are covered by this provision. As a 
result, this exception does not cover an RTA in which one or more of the 
parties are not members of the WTO or are more-developed countries.27  
Developing countries can use the Enabling Clause to their advantage 
in entering into RTAs. All WTO members can derogate from the MFN 
principle in an RTA as long as the parties to the trade mutually eliminate 
tariffs across “substantially all trade.”28  This is allowed under GATT 
Article XXIV for RTAs among WTO members. The Enabling Clause, 
however, allows developing countries to form an RTA that mutually 
eliminates or reduces tariffs, without requiring that they do so across 
“substantially all trade.”29 This allows developing countries to establish 
RTAs that eliminate or reduce tariffs in certain product sectors while 
keeping existing tariffs in place for those perceived as vulnerable to 
foreign competition. 30  Developed countries are not accorded this 
privilege.31 
 
 23. Id. ¶ 2(a)–(d) (emphasis added). 
 24. Id. ¶ 3(a). 
 25. Id. ¶ 2(c). Another decision by WTO members provided a legal ground for an 
exception from the GATT MFN Treatment obligation. See General Council Decision, 
Preferential Tariff Treatment for Least-Developed Countries, Decision on Waiver, 
WT/L/304 (June 17, 1999). This decision did enable developing country members to give 
general system of preference (GSP) tariff treatment to products from least developed 
countries, but it did not involve the RTA issue.    
 26. Enabling Clause, supra note 5, ¶ 2(c) (emphasis added). Of course, here “less-
developed contracting parties” means “less-developed countries which are parties to the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.” GATT, supra note 3, app. I, art. XXIX. 
 27. See Won-Mog Choi, Regional Economic Integration in East Asia: Prospect and 
Jurisprudence, 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 49, 75 (2003). 
 28. See GATT, supra note 3, art. XXIV, ¶¶ 5, 8. 
 29. See Enabling Clause, supra note 5. 
 30. See id.  
 31. See GATT, supra note 3, art. I (requiring MFN treatment for all contracting 
parties). 
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For example, the South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) does 
not require tariffs to be eliminated, only that they be reduced to between 
0% and 5% of current levels within 10 years, in accordance with the 
phased Trade Liberalisation Programme (TLP). 32  Furthermore, items 
kept on the Sensitive List by each contracting state are excluded from 
this reduction program. 33  In the Pakistan-Malaysia FTA, 34  Pakistan 
agreed to eliminate tariffs on only 43.2% of current imports from 
Malaysia by 2012, whereas Malaysia is expected to eliminate tariffs on 
78% of imports from Pakistan.35 In both cases, the Enabling Clause, not 
Article XXIV, was invoked as legal cover for the trade agreement.36 
Subject to certain conditions, additional benefits may also be 
granted by the Enabling Clause with regard to non-tariff measures. When 
forming RTAs, developing countries that are WTO members may choose 
between the “mutual reduction” and “mutual elimination” of non-tariff 
measures “in accordance with criteria or conditions which may be 
prescribed by the contracting parties.”37 Such non-tariff measures include 
import permits, technical measures, and even certain taxes (on top of 
tariffs) imposed on imported products. Tax reduction or elimination can 
involve exempting certain exports of signatory parties from generally 
applicable taxes paid even by local producers. This exemption 
disadvantages any other imported products in terms of taxation. Even if 
this type of measure does not violate the national treatment obligation of 
the GATT, it may breach the MFN treatment obligation with regard to 
internal measures.38  The Enabling Clause thus allows the Contracting 
Parties to prescribe certain criteria or conditions for this reduction or 
 
 32. See Agreement on South Asian Free Trade Area, Jan. 6, 2004, http://www.saarc-
sec.org/userfiles/saftaagreement.pdf, (signed by Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, 
Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka). 
 33. See id. art. 7. The sensitive list of each contracting state includes 150 to 1295 
items. Revised Sensitive Lists Under SAFTA, S. ASIAN ASS’N FOR REGIONAL 
COOPERATION (Mar. 29, 2011), http://www.saarc-
sec.org/areaofcooperation/detail.php?activity_id=35 (last visited Oct. 6, 2011).  
 34. See Agreement Between the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and 
the Government of Malaysia for a Closer Economic Partnership, Pak.-Malay., Nov. 8, 
2007, http://www.commerce.gov.pk/PMFTA/PAk-Malaysia-FTA(TXT).pdf [hereinafter 
Closer Economic Partnership Agreement]. This agreement was the first bilateral FTA 
between two Muslim countries. See GOV’T OF PAKISTAN MINISTRY OF COM., 
http://www.commerce.gov.pk/?page_id=195 (last visited Sept. 28, 2011) (discussing the 
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement for Closer Economic Partnership between Pakistan 
and Malaysia). 
 35. See Closer Economic Partnership Agreement, supra note 34.  
 36. Appendix, supra note 2.  
 37. See Enabling Clause ¶ 2(c) (emphasis omitted). 
 38. See generally Aaditya Mattoo, National Treatment in the GATS: Corner-Stone or 
Pandora’s Box?, 31 J. WORLD TRADE 107 (1997) (explaining the interpretation of the 
national treatment obligation and most favored nation treatment in the GATT, counterpart 
agreement entered into force by the World Trade Organization in 1995). 
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elimination of non-tariff barriers, giving a type of “waiver” to the MFN 
violation problem.  
The least developed countries (LDCs) among the developing 
countries39  forming an RTA can gain even greater benefits from the 
Enabling Clause. Under paragraph 2, subparagraph (d), it is possible to 
accord “special treatment [to] the least developed among the developing 
countries in the context of any general or specific measures in favour of 
developing countries.”40 This provision permits WTO members to give 
“special treatment” to the least developed parties to an RTA that is 
“entered into amongst less-developed contracting parties” within the 
context of paragraph 2, subparagraph (c) of the Enabling Clause.41 In 
particular, the least developed parties to such an RTA may be required to 
make tariff reductions on a smaller scale than those required of other 
developing country parties.42 
For example, under the SAFTA, LDCs are required to reduce tariffs 
to 30% for the initial two-year period and then to between 0% and 5% 
within an eight-year period. On the other hand, non-LDCs must reduce 
tariffs to 20% for the initial two-year period and then to between 0% and 
5% within a shorter five-year period.43 Under the ASEAN Free Trade 
Area (AFTA), the six original members (Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) of ASEAN must 
eliminate tariffs by 2010, and the new members (Cambodia, Laos, 
Myanmar, and Vietnam) must do so by 2015; but tariffs for certain 
sensitive products may be eliminated by 2018.44 
III. CASE FOR “ENABLING” THE ENABLING CLAUSE 
A.  LIMITATIONS OF THE ENABLING CLAUSE 
The current legal framework of the Enabling Clause, which allows 
preferential treatment for RTAs only among developing WTO member 
countries, deserves criticism. Many LDCs cannot practically enter into 
the WTO to take advantage of this preferential treatment, because they 
do not have the capacity to implement the other obligations of WTO 
membership. 45  If RTAs formed between WTO members and non-
 
 39. Unless indicated otherwise, “developing countries” throughout this paper are 
understood to include LDCs. 
 40. See Enabling Clause, supra note 5, ¶ 2(d). 
41.    Id. ¶ 2(c). 
 42. For a detailed discussion, see Choi, supra note 11, at 852–56. 
 43. See Agreement on South Asian Free Trade Area, supra note 32, art. 7.1.  
 44. See Protocol to Amend the Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential 
Tariff (CEPT) Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) for the Elimination of 
Import Duties, art. 1, Jan. 31, 2003, http://www.asean.org/14183.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 
2011). 
 45. See Choi, supra note 11, at 855-856.  
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members are not given preferential treatment, least developed countries 
will have considerable difficulty keeping pace with the rapid proliferation 
of regionalism that has come to characterize the world economy. 46 
Moreover, limiting the preferential treatment given by the Enabling 
Clause to only RTAs formed solely between WTO members and LDCs 
that are also WTO members effectively induces WTO members to 
discriminate among LDCs.47 This contravenes the primary aim of the 
Enabling Clause, which is to give enhanced protection to a single 
common group of countries classified as the “least developed.”48  
Even if all the signatories to an RTA are WTO members, another 
problem exists. If even one signatory to the RTA is not a developing 
country, the agreement is not eligible for benefits provided under 
paragraph 2, subparagraph (c) of the Enabling Clause. In contrast with 
developing countries, developed countries are not enabled to accord 
differential and more favorable treatment to less developed countries 
when forming RTAs with them. 
Because the Enabling Clause does not apply to RTAs formed 
between developed and developing countries, there is no legal basis on 
which a developing or least developed country may ask for a smaller 
tariff reduction when forming an RTA with developed countries. The 
strict requirement of tariff elimination with respect to “substantially all 
the trade” under GATT Article XXIV applies to such cases, and 
developing or least developed countries forming RTAs with developed 
countries will be required to eliminate most trade barriers against their 
developed partners.49 
In this regard, the provisions of Part IV of GATT (Trade and 
Development), which stipulate differential treatment to developing 
country members, 50  may also be ineffective. Despite its ambitious 
objectives to raise the “standards of living” of less developed contracting 
parties—a task that is “particularly urgent” 51—and to “enable less-
developed contracting parties to use special measures to promote their 
trade and development,”52 Part IV does not include any provisions for 
 
 46. See id. 
 47. See id. 
 48. See id. 
 49. GATT, supra note 3, art. XXIV.    
 50. Many have viewed the provisions of Part IV and commitments described therein 
as aspirational and not legally binding on WTO members. See ROBERT HUDEC, 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 57–58 (1987); MITSUO 
MATSUSHITA ET AL., THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAW, PRACTICE AND POLICY 
766 (2d ed. 2006); PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND 
TRADE: A COMMENTARY 267, 270 (2005); M.J. TREBILCOCK & R. HOWSE, THE 
REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 475 (3d ed. 2005). 
 51. See GATT, supra note 3, art. XXXVI, ¶ 1(a). 
 52. See id. art. XXXVI, ¶ 1(f).    
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commitments in the context of negotiating RTAs; the only commitments 
in Part IV are related to negotiations for the reduction or elimination of 
tariffs under GATT Articles XXVIII, XXVIIIbis, and XXXIII—not 
Article XXIV. Therefore, notwithstanding Part IV, GATT Article XXIV 
applies to developing countries without any modification.  
This means that nothing is in fact enabled by the Enabling Clause 
with respect to RTAs between developed and developing countries and 
RTAs between WTO Members (developing or developed) and non-
member developing countries. This is inconsistent with the statement of 
principle in the first paragraph of the Enabling Clause, which reads: 
“Notwithstanding the provisions of Article I of the General Agreement, 
contracting parties may accord differential and more favourable 
treatment to developing countries, without according such treatment to 
other contracting parties.” 53   
Paragraph 2, subparagraph (c) of the Enabling Clause effectively 
nullifies paragraph 1 for RTAs between developed and developing 
countries.54 As such, even if a developed country member of the WTO is 
willing to form an RTA with a developing country that offers smaller 
tariff reductions that do not satisfy the “substantially all the trade” 
requirement, no provision in the WTO Agreements would support such 
an effort. This legal constraint may discourage many developed country 
members of the WTO from forming RTAs with the poorest nations in the 
world. It may also discourage the poorest countries from making efforts 
to integrate their economies with those of developed country members of 
the WTO. This may be one of the reasons why paragraph 2, 
subparagraph (c) of the Enabling Clause has not been widely used and 
why only a small number of RTAs have been reported under it thus far.55  
Statistics seem to bear out this disabling effect. Less than 40% of all 
RTAs in force have been formed between developed and developing 
countries and it is indeed very rare to find RTAs made between 
developed countries and LDCs,56 except for PTAs57 formed between the 
European Union and its former African colonies. 58  Forming PTAs 
between developed countries and LDCs can offer considerable benefits to 
the latter by providing them access to the affluent markets of developed 
countries, without compromising their industrial growth potentials by 
 
 53. See Enabling Clause, supra note 5, ¶ 1. 
 54. See id. ¶ 2 n.2 (noting that the list of measures in paragraph two is an exhaustive 
menu of the approved measures that lead to application of paragraph one, whereas 
anything not mentioned in paragraph two requires WTO members’ ad hoc approval). 
 55. Only 15.4% of all RTAs invoke the Enabling Clause as legal cover. See 
Appendix, supra note 2. 
 56. See id.  
 57. Again, PTAs denote RTAs with limited trade liberalization, whereas FTAs 
authorized under Article XXIV require full liberalization of “substantially all the trade.” 
 58. See Appendix, supra note 2. 
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prematurely opening their markets to the global economy.59 These PTAs 
are not currently possible, either under the provisions of GATT Article 
XXIV, which requires the liberalization of “substantially all the trade,” or 
under the limited Enabling Clause, which gives preferential treatment 
only to RTAs formed solely between developing country members. 
Should the Enabling Clause necessarily enable developed countries 
to provide PTA preferences to developing countries and LDCs? It could 
be argued that it is unnecessary to change the Enabling Clause because 
developed countries can already offer Generalized Systems of 
Preferences (GSPs) to a large number of these countries in order to assist 
their economic development by providing preferential trade terms. 60 
Extensive GSP schemes, such as the European Union’s “Everything-but-
Arms (EBA)” preferential trade scheme, have been devised in favor of 
LDCs.61 It can be further argued that non-discriminatory GSP schemes 
represent a better device for providing trade preferences to developing 
countries than inherently selective and discriminatory RTAs.62 Indeed, 
granting trade preferences through PTAs would benefit only those 
developing countries and LDCs engaged in PTAs and hinder those that 
are not.63  Furthermore, the limited use of the Enabling Clause, even 
among developing countries,64 suggests that it may not be necessary for 
developed countries to grant trade preferences under the Enabling Clause. 
 
 59. See Choi, supra note 11, at 851–53. 
 60. For more information on GSP schemes, see generally About GSP, UNITED 
NATIONS CONF. ON TRADE & DEV. 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=2309&lang=1 (last visited Sept. 
24, 2011). 
 61. The EBA scheme by the European Union is an exemplary trade concession 
scheme for LDCs. It is an initiative of the European Union that allows all imports (except 
for armaments) to the European Union from LDCs to be admitted duty-free and quota-
free. See Generalized System of Preferences: Everything but Arms, EUR. TRADE 
COMMISSION (last updated Oct. 29, 2009) http://ec.europa.eu/trade/wider-
agenda/development/generalised-system-of-preferences/everything-but-
arms/index_en.htm. 
 62. See Generalized System of Preferences, L/3545 (June 25, 1971), GATT B.I.S.D. 
(18th Supp.) at 24, 25 (1971) (“[g]eneralized, non-discriminatory, non-reciprocal 
preferential tariff treatment in the markets of developed countries for products originating 
in developing countries. . . .”), construed in Appellate Body Report, European 
Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, 
¶¶ 142–47 WT/DS246/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2004), available at 
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/wtoab/ec-preferences(ab).pdf (interpreting the 
elements described in the Preamble of the 1971 Decision—“generalized,” “non-
discriminatory,” and “nonreciprocal”—as binding requirements for GSPs); see also 
Lorand Bartels, The WTO Enabling Clause and Positive Conditionality in the European 
Community’s GSP Program, 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 507, 518 (2003). 
 63. See Y.S. Lee, Reconciling RTAs with the WTO Multilateral Trading System: 
Case for a New Sunset Requirement on RTAs and Development Facilitation, 45 J. WORLD 
TRADE 629, 632 (2011). 
 64. Note that less than one third of all RTAs made solely between developing 
countries have invoked the Enabling Clause. See Appendix, supra note 2. 
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Why is the Enabling Clause not widely used, even among 
developing countries? Two possible reasons may be, first, the prevalence 
of the neoclassical economic argument since the 1980s, and second, the 
decline of the infant industry promotion argument in economics. 65 
Because free trade and extensive foreign direct investment, rather than 
trade protection and state facilitation of infant industries, have been 
advocated as means of economic development, an increasing number of 
developing countries have been negotiating FTAs entailing full trade 
liberalization, rather than PTAs entailing limited trade liberalization.66 
Additionally, Eastern European countries, particularly former Soviet 
republics, have been pursuing complete trade liberalization and economic 
integration among themselves, rather than PTAs.67 
B.  CASE FOR REFORM 
Should developed countries be authorized to enter into PTAs with 
developing countries, with limited trade liberalization? If authorized to 
enter into PTAs, more developed countries may be willing to grant trade 
preferences to developing countries. Unlike GSP schemes, which only 
allow the unilateral provision of trade preferences, PTAs allow 
developed countries to receive some reciprocal trade preferences. The 
very objective of the Enabling Clause supports providing such an 
inducement; the Enabling Clause was created to “enable,” not to 
“obligate,” countries to grant trade preferences to developing countries.68 
As such, enabling developed countries to grant trade preferences through 
PTAs under the Enabling Clause is likely to benefit developing countries, 
particularly LDCs.69  
The MFN principle may be further eroded if developed countries are 
allowed to enter into PTAs with developing countries. This may well be 
another ground for objection with respect to the proposed expansion of 
the Enabling Clause. The erosion of the MFN principle has already taken 
place to a significant degree, however, as hundreds of RTAs have been 
 
 65. The neoclassical economic policy stance, often referred as “Washington 
Consensus,” reaffirms that the market promotes economic efficiency and fair social 
distribution. This stance has become the dominant, mainstream academic position 
worldwide, particularly after the 1980s, and also influenced the positions of international 
economic institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, 
and the WTO. With respect to trade, the pursuit of free trade is an important part of the 
neoliberal economic stance. See Y.S. LEE, RECLAIMING DEVELOPMENT IN THE WORLD 
TRADING SYSTEM 51–53 (2009). 
 66. See id.  
 67. As many as 26 bilateral FTAs have been formed among the former Soviet 
republics and put in effect. See Appendix, supra note 2. 
68.   See Enabling Clause, supra note 5, ¶ 1. 
 69. Developed countries, particularly the United States, have been inclined to pursue 
full trade liberalization, not PTAs with partial trade liberalization, with developing 
countries. See LEE, supra note 65, at 51–53. 
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formed since the 1990s.70 Thus, erosion of the MFN principle should not 
be considered solely in the context of expanding the authorization of 
PTAs to include developed countries under the Enabling Clause; instead, 
it should be considered in the context of the current system, which 
already authorizes RTAs on a permanent basis.71  
1.  Revision of the Enabling Clause 
As discussed above, in this era of rapidly proliferating RTAs, it is 
necessary to enable developed countries to accord differential and more 
favorable treatment to developing countries when they form RTAs with 
one another. One way to allow the inclusion of developed countries in 
PTA arrangements would be to revise the current language of the 
Enabling Clause. Specifically, paragraph 2, subparagraph (c) of the 
Enabling Clause could be amended to enable any member of the WTO to 
reduce or eliminate tariffs for its developing country partners when 
forming PTAs, regardless of whether those partners are WTO members. 
This would also allow the reduction or elimination of non-tariff measures 
in favor of developing countries, in accordance with any criteria or 
conditions set. Specifically, the authors propose the following 
amendment to paragraph 2, subparagraph (c) of the Enabling Clause:  
(c)  Regional or global arrangements entered into between contracting parties 
and less developed countries for the mutual reduction or elimination of tariffs 
and, in accordance with criteria or conditions which may be prescribed by the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES, for the mutual reduction or elimination of non-
tariff measures on products imported from one another; 
The operative language of the amended clause is the phrase “less 
developed countries.” This amendment would allow all WTO members, 
whether developed or developing, the flexibility to reduce tariffs in the 
formation of RTAs, not only with other developing country members of 
the WTO, but also with non-member developing countries. It would also 
enable WTO members to accord a further degree of flexibility to the 
LDCs forming the RTA, pursuant to paragraph 2, subparagraph (d).  
2.   Approval and Control Mechanism in GATT Article XXIV, 
Paragraph 10  
Another way to allow flexibility in tariff reductions in the formation 
of PTAs involving less developed countries would be to revitalize the 
special approval procedure under paragraph 10 of GATT Article XXIV, 
which reads:  
The CONTRACTING PARTIES may by a two-thirds majority approve 
 
 70. See Lee, supra note 63, at 633. 
 71. See id. at 637–41 (providing a detailed discussion of the arguments in favor of 
introducing a requirement that RTAs contain a sunset clause). 
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proposals which do not fully comply with the requirements of paragraphs 5 to 9 
inclusive, provided that such proposals lead to the formation of a customs union 
or a free-trade area in the sense of this Article.72  
This provision originates from paragraph 6 of Article 44 of the 
International Trade Organization (ITO) Charter.73 Under that provision, 
ITO members could approve by a “two-thirds majority of the Members 
present and voting” the formation of RTAs that did not “fully comply” 
with the requirements under Article 44.74 According to an opinion of the 
subcommittee responsible for the provision, paragraph 6 of Article 44 
had the effect of “enabl[ing] the Organization to approve the 
establishment of customs unions and free trade areas which include non-
Members.” 75  Moreover, those states that supported giving automatic 
permission under Article 44 only to trade areas “between the territories of 
Members” asserted that paragraph 6 would allow “the formation of 
customs unions and free trade areas which had one or more non-
Members but would give the Organization an essential degree of control” 
over such agreements.76 This demonstrates that some states were in favor 
of allowing the formation of free trade areas between Members and non-
Members. 
The response of the GATT states to the 1951 Nicaragua-El Salvador 
FTA demonstrates this “approval and control” process in action.77 When 
the FTA was formed, Nicaragua was a GATT Member, but El Salvador 
 
 72. GATT, supra note 3, art. XXIV, ¶ 10. 
 73. It can be said that the WTO is in fact the long-delayed successor to the ITO 
project. The ITO Charter was agreed upon at the U.N. Conference on Trade and 
Employment in Havana in March 1948. The negotiators expected the ITO, which was to 
be created by the Charter, to be “the institutional framework to which the GATT . . . would 
be attached.” However, the U.S. Congress “refused to approve the ITO Charter[,] and that 
charter was declared dead by 1951.” Since then, “the GATT, which came into 
(provisional) force in 1948, became the focus of attention as a possible institution through 
which nations could solve some of their trade problems.” See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: CONSTITUTION AND JURISPRUDENCE 12 (1998).  
 74. See Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, art. 44, ¶ 6, Mar. 24, 
1948, in United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Havana, Cuba, Nov. 21, 
1947–Mar. 24, 1948, Final Act and Related Documents, U.N. Doc. E/Conf.2/78 (1948) 
(“The Organization may, by a two-thirds majority of the Members present and voting, 
approve proposals which do not fully comply with the requirements of the preceding 
paragraphs, provided that such proposals lead to the formation of a customs union or of a 
free-trade area in the sense of this Article.”). Later, to reconcile the text of GATT with that 
of the ITO Charter, this provision was incorporated into the GATT and became the 
present-day paragraph ten of GATT Article XXIV. “The sole difference is that for the 
approval[,] the GATT requires a two-thirds majority of ‘members’ whereas the Charter 
required the same majority of ‘members present and voting.’” Choi, supra note 11, at 838.  
 75. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Havana, Cuba, Nov. 
21, 1947–Mar. 24, 1948, Report of Committees and Principle Sub-Committees of the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, at 52, ¶ 27, U.N. Doc. ICITO/1/8 
(Sept. 1948).  
 76. See id. at 51, ¶ 23.  
 77. See Choi, supra note 11, at 839. 
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was not.78 When Nicaragua submitted its notice of the RTA to the GATT 
Secretariat, it used the paragraph-10 mechanism to request permission to 
enter into an RTA with a non-GATT state. 79  The GATT Contracting 
Parties granted Nicaragua’s request for permission to form the FTA, but 
instituted an annual review: 
The CONTRACTING PARTIES decide, in accordance with the provisions of 
Article XXIV, paragraph 10, of the General Agreement, that the Government of 
Nicaragua is entitled to claim the benefits of the provisions of Article XXIV of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade relating to the formation of free-
trade areas, and decide to review the above decision, if at any time after study of 
reports furnished by the Government of Nicaragua and of other relevant data, 
they find that the operation of the Free-Trade Treaty is not resulting in the 
maintenance of a free-trade area in the sense of Article XXIV of the General 
Agreement.80 
By this decision, the contacting parties approved the RTA, subject 
to review of the submitted reports to ensure that the parties continued to 
meet the other requirements of Article XXIV.81 The decision illustrates 
the “approval and control” mechanism envisioned by the drafters of 
paragraph 10.82 
The “approval and control” mechanism was also employed when 
Nicaragua decided to join the Central American Free Trade Area 
(CAFTA).83 Some of the parties to the CAFTA—Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and Honduras—had not acceded to the GATT at the time, so 
Nicaragua again requested permission from the GATT contracting 
parties.84 As before, the parties approved the agreement, but reserved the 
possibility of withdrawing that approval contingent on subsequent 
developments. 85  The approval given this time further reinforced the 
“control” side of the “approval and control” mechanism by setting a 
 
 78. Nicaragua acceded to the GATT on May 28, 1950, and El Salvador acceded to 
the GATT/WTO on May 7, 1995. See Choi, supra note 11, at 840, nn.57–58. 
 79. See id. at 839. 
 80. The Free-trade Area Treaty between Nicaragua and El Salvador, Oct. 25, 1951, 
GATT B.I.S.D. (Vol. II) at 30 (1952).  
 81. The review procedure regarding the approval of Nicaragua’s accession to the 
CAFTA, which was expected to occur in 1961, seems to have been aborted; there is no 
record of such a review. See Choi, supra note 11, at 839–41.  
 82. See id.  
 83. See id. at 840.  
 84. See id.  
 85. See Participation of Nicaragua in Central American Free-trade Area, Nov. 13, 
1956, GATT B.I.S.D. (5th Supp.) at 29, 30 (1957) (“The CONTRACTING PARTIES 
[d]ecide, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 10 of Article XXIV, that the 
Government of Nicaragua is entitled to claim the benefits of the provisions of Article 
XXIV relating to the formation of free-trade areas, and [d]ecide to review this Decision by 
1 January 1961 and at any time thereafter if, after study of reports and of the plan and 
schedule submitted by the Government of Nicaragua, they find that the establishment of a 
free-trade area in the sense of Article XXIV is unlikely to result within ten years of the 
entry into force of the Treaty.”).  
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specific timeframe of five years for the review of the approval, followed 
by subsequent review on a necessary basis. 86  This five-year review 
period was meant to induce non-GATT states to join the GATT.87 Failure 
to accede to the GATT, however, did not automatically lead to a decision 
to withdraw the approval.88  
Subsequent examples of the paragraph-10 mechanism in action are 
few and far between.89 Because of the highly political nature of the RTA 
examination procedure in the GATT/WTO, a tacit practice seems to have 
developed which limits the formal discussion of GATT consistency 
issues among Working Parties when evaluating RTAs involving non-
GATT/WTO states.90 This, however, does not seem to be a permanent 
settlement of this issue. As shown in the above two cases, the possibility 
for claims of inconsistencies in such RTAs has not been removed, and 
some form of legal affirmation of those RTAs may continue to be 
necessary.91  
Revitalizing this approval and control mechanism by requiring 
formal evaluations on RTAs would provide an alternative avenue of 
reform. It could provide legal justification not only to the formation of 
RTAs involving developing countries that are not WTO members, but 
also to the formation of PTAs between developed and developing 
countries. If WTO members were to agree on the regular approval of 
such PTAs, it would effectively overcome the legal constraint imposed 
by Article XXIV’s “substantially all the trade” requirement, which 
prevents developed and less developed countries from using PTAs to 
integrate their economies. 
It should be noted, however, that the paragraph 10 mechanism 
cannot serve as a permanent waiver of the obligation to fulfill the 
“substantially all the trade” condition because paragraph 10 requires that 
 
 86. See id.  
 87. See Choi, supra note 11, at 840. 
 88. See id. 
 89. See id. at 840–41 (“[In the 1960s,] the number of countries willing to go through 
the strict approval procedure of paragraph 10 rapidly increased . . . [and] this general trend 
has become even stronger.”). 
 90. See id. 
 91. A document of record relevant to this issue involves the Interim Agreements of 
bilateral FTAs between the EC and Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. It states: “[t]he 
representative of Japan said that, despite the fact that Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania were 
not members of the WTO, his delegation expected them to respect the obligations of 
GATT Article XXIV and GATS Article V.” Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, 
Examination of the Interim Agreements between the European Communities and the Czech 
Republic, Slovak Republic, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria and Romania and the Free Trade 
Agreements between the European Communities and Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, ¶ 33 
WT/REG1/M/2, WT/REG2/M/2, WT/REG7/M/2, WT/REG8/M/2, WT/REG9/M/2, 
WT/REG18/M/2 (Oct. 3, 1997), available at 
http://www.wtocenter.org.tw/SmartKMS/do/www/readDoc?document_id=40590 (select 
“WTREG18M2.doc”).  
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proposals for the approval should “lead to the formation of a customs 
union or a free-trade area in the sense of this Article.”92 Therefore, any 
arrangement in RTAs that allows less developed parties to depart from 
the “substantially all the trade” rule is unlikely to be permanent. But 
developing-country parties to RTAs could be given more time than the 
normal 10 years to eliminate trade barriers for a substantial number of 
product sectors.93   
Given the nature of this temporary exemption under the paragraph 
10 mechanism, a permanent exemption from the “substantially all the 
trade” rule can only be given by an amendment to the Enabling Clause 
like the one proposed by this article. Alternatively, paragraph 10 could be 
amended to exclude developing countries from the application of the 
condition that “such proposals lead to the formation of a customs union 
or a free-trade area in the sense of this Article,” so as to give a permanent 
waiver in favor of developing countries when they form RTAs with 
developed countries. 
IV.  CONCLUSION   
In forming RTAs, WTO members need to take into account the legal 
problems related to the MFN requirement. GATT Article XXIV provides 
legal cover for RTAs that would otherwise be in violation of the MFN 
requirement. The Enabling Clause provides added flexibility in favor of 
developing countries, but only RTAs formed between WTO-member 
developing countries can claim this flexibility. Consequently, developing 
country members of the WTO lack the legal flexibility to favor other 
developing countries that the commercial reality of development tends to 
demand. This lack of flexibility limits the ability of less developed 
countries to form RTAs with developed economies.  
The solution to this lack of flexibility is to further “enable” the 
Enabling Clause through an amendment that would expand the potential 
reach of PTAs. Although GSPs have been offered as a means for granting 
trade preferences, PTAs would be more effective. Because GSPs are 
unilateral trade preferences, whereas PTAs are not completely unilateral, 
more developed countries might be willing to grant trade preferences to 
developing countries through PTAs if they were authorized, because 
PTAs can also grant some trade preferences to developed countries in 
return. Any LDC parties to such PTAs also deserve more differential and 
favorable treatment. 
 
 92. GATT, supra note 3, art. XXIV, ¶ 10. 
 93. See Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, ¶ 3, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994), 
available at http://www.wto.org/English/docs_e/legal_e/10-24_e.htm.  
 
18 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW [Vol. 21:1 
 
Revitalizing the “approval and control” mechanism in GATT Article 
XXIV could also significantly facilitate PTAs between developed and 
developing countries. A consensus among WTO members on this issue 
would help to temporarily overcome the legal constraint imposed by the 
“substantially all the trade” requirement, which has discouraged 
developed and less developed countries from making efforts to integrate 
their economies. Amending the conditions in paragraph 10 would allow a 
permanent exemption from the “substantially all the trade” rule to be 
given for the benefit of developing countries striving to integrate their 
less developed economies with those of developed countries in this era of 
rapidly proliferating RTAs. Consequently, this would allow WTO 
jurisprudence to align more closely with commercial reality and the 
development needs of developing countries. 
 
